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CASE NoTEs

EMINENT DOMAIN-Valuation-Denial of Compensation for Loss of Business
Incurred by Condemnation Proceedings. Seferi v. Ives, 155 Conn. 580,
236 A.2d 83 (1967).

Plaintiff Seferi owned a lot on which he operated a retail
supermarket. The defendant highway commissioner acquired
the land for highway purposes and awarded plaintiff the sum
of $83,000 which plaintiff promptly refused. Plaintiff appealed the assessment and a state referee found that, taking
into account $10,171 for moving expenses to another location
in the area, the damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason
of the taking were $139,000. The referee also found that the
value of the business was $42,500 and the value of the fixtures
that plaintiff would lose if unable to move his business was
$16,364. He stated that if, as a matter of law, the values of
the business and fixtures, as he found their separate values
to be, were allowed as damages, then the $10,171 for moving
expenses would not be required and the adjusted total would
be $188,000. There was no location or site anywhere in the
area in which they could erect a building into which they
could move their business, including fixtures and equipment.
The trial court found that plaintiff was entitled to the
$188,000 and upon appeal the Supreme Court of Connecticut
reversed that decision and awarded plaintiff only $139,000
(value of the land plus the moving expenses). In doing so,
the court commented that:
[E]ven if the plaintiffs were correct in their claim
in the referee's finding that 'there is no location
or site anywhere in the area which the plaintiffs
could acquire and upon which they could erect a
building to which they could move their business'
is the equivalent of a finding that the plaintiffs
could not move their retail business to any location
whatsoever,
they cannot recover for the loss and damage to their business.'
In other words, the Supreme Court of Connecticut said that
even if the plaintiff was put out of business because of the
taking of the land, the general rule is that he may not be
compensated for such loss. While this may be accepted as
current law there appears to be cause for re-axamining the
basic principles.
1.

Seferi v. Ives, 155 Conn. 580, 236 A.2d 83, 86 (1967).
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The law pertaining to such situations is settled.2 The
case most relied upon is Mitchell v. United States.' Although
this is a relatively old case, it is almost invariably cited whenever a claim for loss of a business is being decided. In Mitchell, Congress had passed the Tucker Act to pay for damages
and losses resulting from the procurement of land to increase
facilities for testing ordinance materials. The landowner
affected by such procurement of land had been using that
land for the business of growing and canning corn of a special
grade and quality. The corn could not be grown anywhere
else and therefore the landowner was out of business. He
received compensation for the land but not for the business
that he actually lost by losing the land.
The court's reasoning in the Mitchell case exemplifies
the reasoning of most state and federal courts handling similar
situations:
The settled rules of law, however, precluded his considering in that determination consequential damages for losses to their business, or for its destruction. (Citations omitted.) No recovery therefore can
be had now as for a taking of the business. There
is no finding as a fact that the Government took
the business, or that what it did was intended as a
taking. If the business was destroyed, the destruction was an unintended incident of the taking of the
land. There can be no recovery under the Tucker
Act if the intention to take is lacking.4 (Emphasis
added.)
The court also stated that for an owner to recover incidental
damages, he "must show some statutory right conferred" by
the state or the right guaranteed in the state or federal
constitution.
Thus, the problem of compensation for the loss of a business resolves itself into two questions: 1) Is such compensation provided for by the state or federal statutes and consti2. "Thus the general rule is that any loss occasioned to a business as a result
of the condemnation of the land upon which it is conducted and which
arises by reason of the necessity of removing such business to another
location is not recoverable." 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.32(1), at
459 (4th ed. 1962); see also United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373 (1945); 27 AM. JuR.2d Eminent Domain § 285 (1966); comment,
67 YALE L.J. 61, 74 (1957).
3. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925).
4. Id. at 345.
5. Id.
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tutions, and 2) What is the definition of 'taking' and when
does the state or federal government 'take'?
The fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United
States provides: "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." The courts interpret
this to mean the taking and compensation for property, i.e.,
land, and not compensation for consequential damages. The
consequential or incidental damages can only be provided for
by an act of Congress.' Accordingly, "injury to a business
carried on upon lands taken for public use, it is generally
held, does not constitute an element of just compensation." 7
The states' constitutions and statutes vary. They either
follow the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution,
or enumerate what damages will be compensated. The constitution of Connecticut, where the principal case arose, is typical
of the former. It states that "the property of no person shall
be taken for public use, without compensation therefore."' It
can be easily seen from the holding of the Seferi case that
this is interpreted the same way as is the United States Constitution. The Rhode Island statutes are an example of the
latter, and are discussed in Joslin Co. v. Providence where
the Supreme Court said that injury to business is only allowed
by statute and the statute only grants a right.
The present concern is with the state and federal constitutions of the first category, where it appears that in the
absence of enumeraed damages, one is not afforded compensation. As already pointed out, under such constitutions, loss
of one's business is not compensated." The reasoning for
this policy brings us to the second question: What is a taking?
In defining the term taking, the courts have gone along
with the way the government likes to have it defined. The
basic element in a taking is that "there must be a physical
appropriation of the property and a dispossession of the
owner, for public use."" "The sovereign ordinarily takes the
6. "[D]amage alone gives courts no power to require compensation where there
is not an actual taking of property. (Citations omitted.) Such losses may
be compensated by legislative authority, not by force of the Constitution
alone." United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945).
7. Joslin Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 675 (1922).
8. CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
9. Joslin Co. v. Providence, supra note 7, at 675.
10. See notes 2, 6 and 7.
11. JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 47 at 69 (1st ed. 1957).
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It does not condemn one's business, "it condemns his

property.'" In other words, that which the government
appropriates and uses, is that which the government "takes".
Land is what the government needs so land is what it takes;
whether it be for railroads in the 1800's or for highways,
parks, or urban redevelopment in the 1960's. Since this has
been the prime objective and use of condemnation proceedings, the courts allow compensation merely for the land taken
by the government only lately admitting that the land might
be worth more for its particular adaptability to certain uses
and therefore giving the "market value" of the land.'
Since the state needs the land, it "takes" the land and
if by chance there is a business being conducted upon that
particular land and the state has no use for it, the state does
not take the business but rather allows it to be removed.
Examples of this are illustrated in Seferi v. Ives, 5 the principal case, where the government had no use for a retail
market and therefore did not take it, and Housing Authority
of City of Bridgeport v. Lustig 6 where the state did not take
over a poultry business. The courts hold to the view that
there can be no recovery if the intention to take is lacking.'
Where there is an intent to take a business, i.e., run it, then
the owner is allowed compensation.'"
Thus, a taking is very narrowly defined and such definition is in the favor of the taker or condemnor. He compensates
for the land that he takes to use and the business that he
takes to run. If, in effect, the landowner by moving from the
land, is put out of business, he is not compensated for the loss
of such business as evidenced in the Seferi, Mitchell, and
Sgarlot cases.
12. United States v. General Motors Corp., supra note 2, at 379.
13. Sgarlot Estate v. Commonwealth, 398 Pa. 406, 158 A.2d 541, 543 (1960).
14. Id. at 543; Housing Authority of City of Bridgeport v. Lustig, 139 Conn.
73, 90 A.2d 169 (1952); "[I]t is proper to take into consideration the
existence of a going business on the land in question as indicative of the
highest economic use to which the land may be put." Seferi v. Ives, supra
note 1, at 85.
15. Seferi v. Ives, supra note 1.
16. Housing Authority of City of Bridgeport v. Lustig, supra note 14.
17. Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918).
18. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). Here, the government took plaintiff's land, plant, and equpiment because it needed the
facilities for a nearby base during World War II. They allowed him
compensation for the use of said facilities and gave them back to him
when they were no longer required.
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Each time that a piece of property is condemned and
the owner is forced to move and lose his business, the courts
throw out the old standby principles. "A condemnation proceeding is a proceeding in rem; it is not the taking of rights
in the ordinary sense, but is an appropriation of physical
There is no finding that the government took
properties.". ".
the business, or that what it did was intended as a taking.
If the business was destroyed, the destruction was an unintended incident of taking the land."I2 ° The Sgarlot case came
directly to the point: "The Commonwealth does not condemn
an owner's business acumen or its results expressed in value.
It condemns his property ....',,1
Yet, other courts, while following the above principles
have revealed their own feelings on the inequities of such
rulings. They have stated that the consequences are harsh,2"
and that even though it is the law, it works hardships."5 Inthe case of City of Oakland v. Pacific Lumber & Mill Co.,2
where the state condemned land between landowner's mill and
his access to the necessary water power and in effect put him
out of the milling business, the court states an opinion that
is quite in accord with this writer's opinion: "Indeed, this
is but another way of phrasing the real contention of the
appellant, . . . that the business is property and when the
taking by the state or its agencies interferes with, impairs,
damages, or destroys a business, compensation may be recovered therefore. We are not to be understood as saying that
this should not be the law when we do say that it is not our
law."" (Emphasis added.) Here there is evidence that the
courts, while following the old, well setted rules, are at least
cognizant of the very outstanding fact that when a landowner
must move his business, and as a direct result of that moving
loses that business, his business has in fact been taken and he
should be compensated for it.
The need for an enlightened definition of "taking" is
apparent and there are a few cases in Connecticut that seem
Reeves v. City of Dallas, 195 S.W.2d 575, 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
Mitchell v. United States, supra note 3, at 345.
Sgarlot Estate v. Commonwealth, supra note 13, at 543.
United States v. General Motors Corp., supra note 2, at 382.
City of Newark v. Cook, 99 N.J.E. 527, 133 A. 875, 879 (1926)
City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153
P. 705 (1915).
25. Id. at 707.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
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to be moving away from the established rule to include more
compensation for incidental losses and this reveals how the
court in the Seferi case stood still, where it could have taken
a very important step toward the goal of just compensation.
In Harvey Textile Co. v. Hill,2 ' the Highway Commissioner condemned land for a highway on which the owner
had a factory. The court, claiming that it was not departing
from the market value test, allowed a factory to recover its
costs in relocating its industry holding that moving costs
should be considered a part of the market value of the condemned property since an owner's willingness to sell would
be influenced by his consideration of having to move his
factory. Two years later there was a further departure from
the prevailing rule in the case of Housing Authority of the
City of Bridgeport v. Lustig" where the court held that a
going business on a piece of property is an element to be
considered in the determination of the fair market value of
the land, if the land is enhanced by the use of it for business
purposes (yet the business itself was not compensated for).
It should be noted that both the principles of moving expenses
compensation and enhanced value compensation were used
in the Seferi case.'.
As we are looking at such diversions from the established
rules, we must consider the case of Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States, 9 where the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision,
compensated the owner for his loss of his trade routes while
the military was using his business facilities. It is interesting
to note that the trade routes were not "taken", yet were
compensated.
This very fact in the Kimball case that the condemnor
was ordered to pay the owner for the loss of his trade routes
(which in the operation of a laundry is actually a key part
of the business), combined with the trend in the Harvey Textile and City of Bridgeport cases broadening the market value
rule to include some incidental losses, is an indication that the
United States Supreme Court could decide the Mitchell and
Seferi cases differently today. The above trend set by Harvey
26.
27.
28.
29.

Harvey Textile Co. v. Hill, 135 Conn. 686, 67 A.2d 851 (1949).
Housing Authority of City of Bridgeport v. Lustig, supra note 14.
Seferi v. Ives, supra note 1, at 84, 85.
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, supra note 18.
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and Bridgeport,as evidenced by the steps of allowing moving
expenses and then going concern considerations, has set the
stage for the next natural, logical and justifiable step of
compensating one for his actual loss of business caused by
the condemnation.
The state and federal governments have some valid reasons for opposing such compensation. The damages are too
speculative,"0 and to allow such damages would tend to greatly
increase and make indefinite the costs of eminent domain,
thereby discouraging public improvements. 1 Also, in many
cases the condemnor would be purchasing something it will
not receive. Yet, on the other hand we see that the business
owner has no free choice to stay in that particular business
or start another type of business, perhaps somewhere else.
Stricter zoning laws, less land, and more occasions of such
inability to relocate illustrate the point that there will be
greater damages to businesses by eminent domain proceedings
in the future and suggest strong reason for a relaxing of the
strict rule of taking.
Of course, such a "relaxing" could go to extremes and
public improvements would be hampered. But with today's
ability to forecast damages, profits, moving expenses, etc.,
the courts should allow a businessman in the Seferi and Mitchell situations to prove his damages, and when it is proven
that he has lost his business, he should be compensated. Accordingly, one man would not be required to bear more than
his share of the expenses for his neighbor's gain, the burden
would be placed over a larger number of people making the
loss easier to bear, and the lawmaker's goal of just compensation would be one step closer.
In taking that step, the courts should recognize the necessity and legality of compensating businessmen in such situations. They should objectively rule on a case to case basis,
allowing only the damages that are reasonable and certain
with a goal of balancing the interests between the public and
the businessman thereby arriving at an equitable result for
both sides.
FRANK D. NEVILLE
30. Southern Amusement Co. v. United States, 265 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1959);
Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 668 (1925).
31. 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAINS 77, at 334 (2nd ed. 1953).
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